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Abstract: Departing from a political economy analysis of the benefits of common
debt issuance by the Eurozone member states, we examine to what extent the
various proposals for Eurobonds may be considered admissible under EU law and
exemplary national (constitutional) laws, including those of Germany, Estonia,
France, Ireland and Poland, from which one can deduce general national constitu-
tional requirements applicable in all Eurozone member states. The medium and
long-term potential gains from increased Eurozone stability and improved fiscal
disciplinemust be traded off against the considerable legal and political obstacles of
implementing any of these proposals. Yet key to the success of any common debt
issuance is the effective dealing with the legacy debt of the Eurozonemember states.
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1 Introduction
In seeking long-term solutions to the sovereign debt crisis that has dominated
European Union policies and debates, common debt issuing in the euro area
has been debated by academics and policy makers alike, primarily as a means
to provide for a structural instrument to cope with Member States being in
financial distress. These debates on what has been coined “Eurobonds” have
resulted in a number of notable proposals from academia, namely by econo-
mists (De Grauwe and Moesen, 2009; Delpla and von Weizsäcker, 2010;
Juncker and Tremonti, 2010; Brunnermeier et al., 2011; De la Dehesa, 2011;
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Suarez, 2011; Favero and Missale, 2012), and cumulated in the 2011 European
Commission Green Book on the feasibility of introducing Stability Bonds
(European Commission, 2011), as well as a European Parliament Resolution on
this topic (European Parliament, 2011). While some euro area Member States have
signalled support for a system of common debt issuing, namely France and Italy,
others were openly opposed to such an idea. The German government explicitly
rejected such plans; the German chancellor Merkel went on record as dismissing
the European Commission’s plans as “extraordinarily distressing” and “inap-
propriate”.1 While these plans did not materialize into concrete legislative pro-
posals, they remained on the European policy agenda for some time. In the
European Commission’s 2012 blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and
monetary union, which aimed at proposing “steps towards a full banking,
economic, fiscal and political union”, the common issuance of debt was con-
sidered as a way to create “new means through which governments finance their
debt and offer safe and liquid investment opportunities for savers and financial
institutions, as well as a euro area-wide integrated bond market that matches its
US dollar counterpart in terms of size and liquidity” (European Commission,
2012:3/13). Also the 2012 Four-Presidents Report proposed the establishment of
a “well-defined and limited fiscal capacity” at the Union level, which should then
“offer an appropriate basis for common debt issuance without resorting to the
mutualisation of sovereign debt” (van Rompuy, 2012:5/12). Yet, interestingly,
while promoting the idea of a fiscal union, the 2015 Five-Presidents Report
does not refer to common debt issuance at all. Instead, the Report proposes
other strategies to increase the sustainability of public debt and the working of
fiscal automatic stabilisers at the Union level (Juncker et al., 2015). For the time
being, the project of Euro- or Stability Bonds seems to have been shelved at the
European level due to a lack of sufficient political support.
In the following, it will be argued that common debt issuing should,
from a political economy point of view, not be dismissed as an instru-
ment to build a more sustainable Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Under certain conditions, common debt issuance appears to be even a more
promising way to impose fiscal discipline than the traditional way of
economic policy coordination, namely the Stability and Growth Pact,2
1 As reported by the German weekly journal Der Spiegel. www.spiegel.de/international/busi
ness/euro-bonds-debate-german-resistance-to-pooling-debt-may-be-shrinking-a-799692.html
2 European Council, Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact, 17 June 1997, OJ 1997 C 236/1;
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 1997 L 209/1 amended
by Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005, OJ 2005 L 174/1 and by Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011,
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Six Pack,3 Two Pack4 and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance
in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG).5 Yet, whilst there are political
economy arguments for certain models of “Eurobonds”, common debt issuance
comes with significant legal challenges at European and national constitutional
level. Following the elaboration of the political economy considerations (Section
3), the broader constitutional implications (Section 4) of the several models of
“Eurobonds” as proposed by academics (Section 2) will be examined.
2 The various models of “Eurobonds”
Academia developed several models of “Eurobonds”, which differ significantly.
The proposals can be distinguished according to the guarantee structure, to the
extent to which bonds issued at the European level would substitute national
sovereign bonds, to the way they address the “moral hazard” problem, and to
the nature of mutualised debt.
Firstly, as regards the guarantee structure, there are proposals that refer to
joint and several guarantees by the participating Member States (Delpla and von
Weizsäcker, 2010; Jones, 2010; Favero and Missale, 2012) and those that prefer
OJ 2011 L 306/12; Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 1997 L 209/6 amended by Council
Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005, OJ 2005 L 174/5 and by Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011,
OJ 2011 L 306/33.
3 The “Six Pack” consists of five regulations and one directive: Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 on
the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJ 2011 L 306/1; Regulation
(EU) No 1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in
the euro area, OJ 2011 L 306/8; Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 amending Council Regulation (EU)
No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance
and coordination of economic policies, OJ 2011 L 306/12; Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ 2011 L 306/25; Council Regulation
(EU) No 1177/2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 2011 L 306/33; Council Directive 2011/85/
EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, OJ 2011 L 306/41.
4 The “Two Pack” consists of two regulations: Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 on the strengthen-
ing of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, OJ 2013, L 140/1, and
Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budget-
ary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area,
OJ 2013, L 140/11.
5 Available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/european-council/pdf/Treaty-on-Stability-
Coordination-and-Governance-TSCG.
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pro-rata Eurobonds, where participating Member States would only be liable
for their predefined share of the overall “Eurobond” liabilities (Juncker and
Tremonti, 2010; De Grauwe and Moesen, 2009). Secondly, some proposals entail
that Eurobonds would replace all national bonds, whereas others plead for a
substitution of only a part of national bonds. The most prominent one amongst
the partial substitution proposals intends to replace all national debt below 60%
of GDP by Eurobonds with senior status superior to the remaining national bonds
that refinance all national debt above 60% of GDP (Delpla and von Weizsäcker,
2010). Thirdly, “moral hazard” is addressed by all proposals advocating joint and
several liability, as “moral hazard” arises from the reduced incentives for
Member States for fiscal discipline under such a liability regime. Proposals
referring to partial substitution of national bonds consider “moral hazard” to
be sufficiently addressed by the costs of refinancing the remaining national debt
with national junior bonds (Delpla and von Weizsäcker, 2010). Another proposal
seeks to overcome the “moral hazard” issue with short-term maturity of mutua-
lised debt of less than one year (Hellwig and Philippon, 2011). According to this
proposal, participation in the common issuance of short-term debt is conditional
on fiscal discipline so that each year when new short-term debt is to be issued,
European authorities decide on whether a Member State remains part of the
common issuance. Other proposals suggest to set reinforced fiscal surveillance as
a precondition for introducing joint and several liability (European Commission,
2011:8). Costs and benefits should be equalised according to a third group of
proposals, which suggest the introduction of a scheme that compensates stron-
ger participating states for gaining some liquidity but assuming the higher credit
risks of weaker participating Member States (Favero and Missale, 2012:263; De
Grauwe and Moesen, 2009; Mayordomo et al., 2009; Boonstra, 2010; Muellbauer,
2011). Such a compensation scheme indexes the interest to be paid by the
participating Member States. Since markets are no longer in a position to indicate
the costs for the “national share” in Eurobonds, the interest would have to be
calculated based on the default risk priced in national bonds issued before the
introduction of Eurobonds (De Grauwe and Moesen, 2009), based on Credit
Default Swaps (CDS) (Mayordomo et al., 2009), or based on fiscal parameters,
e.g. referring to deficits and debt levels, set administratively by a European
authority (Muellbauer, 2011; Favero and Missale, 2012:264). Moreover, some
proposals include penalties in case of free-riding or violations of fiscal discipline,
such as losing access to European funds (Boonstra, 2010:5).
Fourthly and finally, as regards the kind of debt that is to be mutualised,
one can distinguish proposals that seek only to mutualise national debt accu-
mulated in the past (Sachverständigenrat, 2011) and those that aim at the
common issuance of future debt.
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In sum and for the sake of further assessment, questions revolving around
the legal feasibility of “Eurobonds” have to address whether, first, a Member
State can in principle be held liable for the debt of other Member States,
whether, second, any joint and several liability must be limited to a certain
amount of debt (defined by its size, its maturity or the date of issuance of the
incurred debt) and, thirdly, whether a compensation scheme could overcome
the legal obstacles relating to the common issuance of debt. Before addressing
these legal questions, the political economy rationale underlying common
debt issuing shall be highlighted in order to set the stage for the subsequent
assessment of the constitutional implications of the several proposed models of
Eurobonds.
3 The political-economy case for common debt
issuing in the euro area6
3.1 Imposing fiscal discipline
The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has shown that a system in which
countries that share a common currency remain in charge of financing their own
government debt is inherently unstable. Countries in a currency union do not
have their own monetary policies or exchange rates. Consequently, a crisis
cannot be (temporarily) alleviated by reducing interest rates or by devaluing
the currency. Moreover, in times of crisis, national central banks are not in a
position to provide their governments with infinite liquidity by buying sovereign
bonds. These circumstances can trigger a situation in which financial market
concerns about a country’s fiscal sustainability may become self-fulfilling pro-
phecies. As pointed out by several authors, a solvent sovereign could be tripped
into a fundamentally unwarranted payments default if the market were to adopt
the “self-fulfilling fear equilibrium belief” that the government is not solvent
(De Grauwe, 2011; Gros, 2012; Buiter and Rahbari, 2012). As long as market
confidence is high, the government can afford the interest payments, as borrow-
ing cost will be relatively low. However, if market confidence is low for reasons
that need not be related to government policies, the government may face a
problem, as the high risk premium requested will make debt service so expen-
sive that the country’s fiscal policy becomes unsustainable. Doubts about the
6 The following part heavily draws on de Haan et al. (2012, 2016).
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government’s ability to service its debt could thus become self-fulfilling, as
uncertainty about the ability to pay lead to higher rates of interest and thus
ultimately to unsustainable fiscal policy.7 De Haan et al. (2014) have found
periods of such misalignments for Greece, Portugal and Ireland.8 In fact, this
problem may even occur if the government has a balanced budget, as a govern-
ment that is highly indebted has to refinance a part of the debt that matures
every year and thus requires refinancing. Because all countries in the euro area
are vulnerable to these processes, financial turmoil in one Member State can
easily spread to another. The implication of this analysis is, as Philippon (2015)
has pointed out, that a “currency union needs a shared safe asset. That safe
asset should not be the bonds of one particular member because this could
trigger episodes of sudden stops and flight to safety. The price of a safe asset
should increase in bad times, providing cheap funding to its issuers precisely
when it is most needed.”
Yet, in the case of the euro area Member States, a system of common debt
issuing should not be limited to a crisis instrument to compensate for the
absence of autonomous monetary policy instruments and exchange rates. In
fact, it can also be perceived as a structural instrument to strengthen economic
policy coordination in an EMU. Anno 2016 it has become abundantly clear that
the legal framework on economic policy coordination introduced by the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and thereafter operationalized by the Stability and
Growth Pact in 1997 did not impose sufficient discipline on Member States before
and, notably, after the introduction of the single currency. As has been argued
elsewhere, the basic weakness of the framework has been its reliance on peer
review and the lack of political will on the parts of the participating Member
States to observe the basic fiscal rules laid down in Article 126(1) TFEU
(Amtenbrink et al., 1997; de Haan et al., 2004; Amtenbrink and de Haan,
2006). These rules have been broken on numerous occasions by almost all
Member States, in the context of which the limited enforcement system foreseen
in Article 126(9)-(11) TFEU and Council Regulations 1466/97 and 1467/97, which
form the core pillars of the Stability and Growth Pact, has moreover not been
consistently applied. Undoubtedly the most referred to example involves the
Council of the European Union’s dealing in 2003 with persistently high
7 So there may be overshooting of bond yields. Yet, there is no consensus on the size and nature
of this overshooting in the fast-growing literature on this topic. According to de Haan et al.
(2014), who provide a summary of this literature, this in part reflects modelling uncertainty.
8 While these authors do not find support for consistent and massive mispricing for all
countries in the periphery of the euro area, they do identify periods with misalignments for
Greece, Portugal and Ireland.
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government deficits in Germany and France that has resulted in an infringement
procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ).9
What is more, the mechanisms foreseen in primary Union law, namely in the
shape of the prohibition of monetary financing (Article 123(2) TFEU) and the
prohibition for Member States or the Union to take on the commitments of
another Member State (Article 125 TFEU), to let financial markets function as
a disciplining force on Member States with high government debts, have not
been particularly successful. Financial markets did not discipline euro area
governments, as before the crisis they hardly differentiated between sovereign
bonds, treating them all as (almost) risk-free.10 General risk aversion was very
low before the crisis and financial markets apparently did not consider Article
125 TFEU as credible or – assuming a legal analysis on their part – as legally
excluding all kinds of financial assistance, expecting instead that the Union
would “renege” on a strict reading of this provision, “if needed, to avert a
financial crisis” (Buti and Carnot, 2012:903). What is more, when market disci-
pline eventually came by the end of the decade, financial markets were no
longer willing to lend to certain countries (a so-called “sudden stop”).
Considering this experience, it is questionable whether the current system,
which considerably relies on market discipline to keep Member States from
overspending, can actually contribute to a sustainable system of economic
policy coordination in the EMU. In fact, providing for such a sustainable system
may require a shift in paradigm, which entails excluding Member States from
entering the capital market on their own initiative.
Generally speaking, proposals for common debt issuing can be differen-
tiated based on whether they suggest partial (Section 3.2) or complete
(Section 3.3) substitution of national sovereign bonds. Both approaches have
one problem in common, which concerns legacy debt (Section 3.4).
3.2 Introducing European next to national sovereign bonds
From the point of view of common debt issuing as an economic policy instru-
ment, the introduction of a partial communitarisation of debt issuing is ques-
tionable. For proposals that suggest a partial substitution by Eurobonds (such as
9 ECJ, Case C-27/04, Commission v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2004:436.
10 De Grauwe and Ji (2012) argue that in the 2000–08 period, spreads were very close to zero
even though the underlying fundamentals differed widely. According to these authors, the
dramatic increase in spreads since 2008 significantly exceeded the changes in the underlying
fundamentals.
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the “red bonds” in the Delpla and von Weizsäcker proposal), given past experi-
ence, it is by no means evident that for the part of the debt that remains
national, markets will indeed consider the new “no bail-out threat”, the main
argument against “moral hazard”, for this part of the government debt to be
more credible than past arrangements. By leaving part of the national debt to the
Member States, no effective tools exist to actually force Member States to change
their behaviour. Furthermore, as far as the junior national bonds are concerned,
the proposed system does not rule out future market speculation against indi-
vidual Member States.
3.3 Replacing national sovereign bonds by Eurobonds
A complete centralization of debt issuance in the euro area accompanied by joint
and several liability for sovereign debt issued at the European Union level is the
preferred option from a political economy perspective. Similarly to what can
currently be observed for the ESM, loans would be granted against a common
interest rate that covers the funding authority’s cost of funding and operations.11
In this regard, de Haan et al. (2012, 2013) have argued that Eurobonds can be an
effective instrument to enforce fiscal discipline if countries can no longer access
capital and money markets on their own initiative at all.
As observed above, common debt issuing causes a moral hazard problem,
as Member States may be tempted to free ride on other countries’ legal obliga-
tions to assume their debt in case of default. In fact, this is what Article 125 TFEU
meant to rule out, that is that Member States can escape “the logic of the market
when they enter into debt” (see further Section 4.1). What is more, the reduction
of the borrowing costs at an aggregated level could disincentivise euro area
Member States from conducting sound budgetary policies and undertake neces-
sary structural reform measures, effects which would offset economic policy
coordination. For this reason, a communitarisation of debt should be subject
to the strict conditionality of any loans granted. In this context, the establish-
ment of an independent Budgetary Authority has been proposed. The Authority
should not only become the sole issuer of European sovereign bonds and thus
have the exclusive right to grant loans to euro area Member States, but in such
instances it should also be in charge of setting the conditions under which such
loans are granted and, thereafter, of enforcing compliance with such conditions
(de Haan et al., 2012, 2013). Member States would retain the autonomy to
11 See the General Terms for the ESM Financial Facility Agreements, adopted by the ESM Board
of Directors, 8 December 2014.
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determine the size and composition of their national budgets, within the bound-
aries set by primary and secondary Union law and the TSCG, namely to have a
balanced budget or a surplus in the medium term.
In a system where common debt issuing in the shape of Eurobonds would
be the sole finance vehicle, the sanction regime would be arguably much more
credible than anything that is currently imposed on non-compliant Member
States because countries would have no access to finance except via the
Budgetary Authority. This way, Member States will have every incentive to
bring their public finances in line with the fiscal rules so as not to become
subject to the strict conditionality regime, thereby addressing the moral hazard
problem.
3.4 Dealing with legacy debt
The introduction of any partial or full communitarisation of debt issuing
requires Member States and/or the EU to deal with any existing debt overhang
in the participating euro area Member States first, making such a system a
medium to long-term solution, rather than a quick fix in any ongoing crisis.
Indeed, as Gros (2011) has rightly pointed out, “highly indebted countries would
immediately be forced into a debt restructuring as they could no longer find
buyers for the part only guaranteed nationally. This is why the system of blue/
red bonds proposed by Delpla and Weizsäcker (2010) […] cannot work if the
countries concerned have a debt overhang”. This requires the installation of a
separate debt redemption mechanism, such as proposed by the German Council
of Economic Experts, which, in a nutshell, amounts to “a binding commitment
of all participating countries to bring public debt ratios below the reference
value of 60% within the next 20 to 25 years”. The “participating countries can
transfer their excessive debt exceeding the 60% threshold at a certain date, into
a redemption fund for which participating member countries are jointly and
severally liable” (Doluca et al., 2012:1).
4 Constitutional implications
In a multidimensional legal system such as the European Union, the question of
the broader constitutional implications of the introduction of common debt
issuing arises both at the supranational, European (Section 4.1) and the national
constitutional level (Section 4.2) (Athanassious, 2011:570–572).
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4.1 Supranational perspective
From a Union law perspective, it is clear that the proposal to prohibit Member
States from entering the capital and money markets on their own initiative for
refinancing purposes is difficult to reconcile with today’s Title VIII chapter 1
TFEU, both as regards the underlying principles and substantive prohibitions
included therein.
Namely by means of Article 123 [prohibition of monetary financing], Article
124 [prohibition of privileged access to financial institutions] and the aforemen-
tioned Article 125 TFEU, the drafters of the EMU legal framework have intro-
duced financial markets as a disciplining factor for Member States, as the latter
are bound to refinance themselves at market conditions, thereby directly facing
“the economic and budgetary consequences of a rising government debt”
(Kämmerer, 2012:152)12 in the shape of the default risk premium. By banning
access to financial markets altogether, the implementation of the proposal
introduced in Section 3.3 would turn one of the leading principles of the EMU
on its head. As such, it is arguably hard to reconcile with the underlying
rationale of today’s Articles 123–125 TFEU.
Against this background, the question of whether a system of common debt
issuing would also run counter to the substantive prohibition of Article 125 TFEU
is somewhat secondary, as an amendment of primary Union law is inevitable in
any event. Be that as it may, it has been argued that a system of common debt
issuing that is secured by the joint and several liability of the participating
Member States would violate the so-called “no bailout clause”. Arguably this
does not already result from the granting of loans by a Union body to a Member
State as such, as it has been rightly observed that a legal differentiation has to
be made between the acceptance of existing commitments and the issuing of
additional loans (Heun and Thiele, 2012:979). However, joint and several liability
implies that each guaranteeing Member State can be approached for the pay-
ment of the total amount guaranteed (Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund
and Eurobills, 2014). Rather than to assume the existing commitments of the
receiving Member State or only the creation of new commitments vis-à-vis a
European or international body, in a system with not only joint but also several
liability, Member States potentially take on each other’s commitments deriving
from the obligations under the common debt issuing scheme itself (Expert Group
on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills, 2014:58–59).13
12 Authors’ translation.
13 These authors also reject the idea that Art. 125 TFEU does not stand in the way, as the joint
and several liability actually arises vis-à-vis the debt-issuing body rather than the other
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The ECJ has not as such ruled on the compatibility of common debt issuing
with Union law, but the Court’s interpretation of the relevant legal framework in
its preliminary rulings in the cases Pringle and Gauweiler provide some impor-
tant clues. In Pringle the ECJ emphasized in the context of the ESM that Article
125 TFEU does not prevent the Union or the Member States “from granting any
form of financial assistance whatever to another Member State”, in this context
also referring to the stricter formulation of the prohibition of monetary financing
of Article 123 TFEU.14 Reflecting on what kind of financial assistance is compa-
tible with Article 125 TFEU, the European judges in Pringle refer to the origins of
this provision and observe that it “ensures that the Member States remain
subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that ought
to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline. Compliance with such disci-
pline contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely
maintaining the financial stability of the monetary union.”15 Consequently, in
the view of the ECJ, “financial assistance as a result of which the incentive of the
recipient Member State to conduct a sound budgetary policy is diminished” is
prohibited, as is “the activation of financial assistance by means of a stability
mechanism such as the ESM […] unless subject to strict conditions.”16 This
approach is confirmed in Gauweiler, where the ECJ in the context of the assess-
ment of the ECB’s announcement of outright monetary transactions in secondary
sovereign bond markets has reiterated that the prohibition of monetary finan-
cing is to ensure that Member States adopt budgetary policies that take into
account their refinancing needs on the markets and in doing so must bear the
consequences “which a change in their macroeconomic or budgetary situation
may have in that regard.”17
As stated in Pringle, Member States may receive financial assistance if they
remain responsible for their commitments and if the conditions attached thereto
animate them “to implement a sound budgetary policy”.18 With regard to the
ESM, the ECJ considers the stability support and the credit line that can be
granted to Member States to be in conformity with Article 125 TFEU, pointing out
participating Member States. Referring to the reasoned opinion of AG Kokott in Pringle, in their
opinion Art. 125 TFEU also excludes “guaranteeing for any international organisation which is
controlled by the Member States and thus an emanation of them”. See also Smits (2011:2), who
states that a reference to the argument that the Member States in effect assume liability for the
debt issuing body “skirts the limits of the law”.
14 Case C-370/12 Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 130, 132.
15 Case C-370/12 Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 135.
16 Case C-370/12 Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 136. Brackets added.
17 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler et al., ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para. 114.
18 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler et al., ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para. 137.
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that the ESM does not effectively take on existing commitments or assume the
debts of the recipient Member State. Instead, new debt is created that is owed to
the ESM, and the loans are subject to strict policy conditionality. Yet, it should
not be hastily concluded from this that the ECJ would therefore necessarily
consider common debt issuing with joint and several liability also to be in
conformity with primary Union law. Whilst the introduction of conditionality
linked to a system of common debt issuing would accommodate the ECJ case
law on this point, it is questionable whether a system of joint and several
liability would be viewed in a similar vain. The reason for this is that according
to the ESM Treaty, which formed the reference point for the ECJ’s assessment of
the scope of Article 125 TFEU, the liability of each participating Member State is
limited, in all circumstances, to its portion of the authorised capital stock, and
Member States are not liable, by reason of their membership, for obligations of
the ESM (Art. 8(5) ESM-Treaty). What is more, changes in the authorized capital
stock of the ESM are subject to national ratification procedures. As explained
above, in a system of joint and several liability, Member States that are held
liable for the total guarantee sum effectively take on other Member States’
commitments in this regard.
What is more, the ECJ has stressed in rather general terms that the activa-
tion of financial assistance by means of a stability mechanism such as the ESM
is not compatible with Article 125 TFEU unless it is “indispensable for the
safeguarding of the financial stability of the euro area as a whole”,19 which is
also reflected by paragraph 3 of Article 136 TFEU, stating the conditions for the
establishment of a stability mechanism.20 In analysing the ESM Treaty, the
Court observes approvingly that financial assistance is only foreseen for coun-
tries “which are experiencing or are threatened by severe financing problems
only when such support is indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of
the euro area as a whole and of its Member States” and thus not “as soon as a
Member State whose currency is the euro is experiencing difficulties in obtain-
ing financing on the market.”21 This broad interpretation of Article 125 TFEU
could be interpreted to rule out a system in which loans would be granted to
Member States based on their individual budgetary needs, rather than with the
overarching objective of the financial stability of the euro area as a whole.
19 Case C-370/12 Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 136.
20 See European Council decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States
whose currency is the euro (2011/199/EU), OJ 2011 L91/1.
21 Case C-370/12 Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 142.
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In sum, against the background of these findings, a revision of Article 125
TFEU alone, for example along the lines of what Smits (2011:4) has suggested in
the past,22 would not suffice to introduce the proposed system of common debt
issuing, given the shift in paradigm that comes with the introduction of an
obligation at least for euro area Member States to turn to the EU level for all
their refinancing needs. The need for a more substantive Treaty amendment
would arise even more if proposals for the establishment of a new European
body charged with common debt issuing (e.g. a European budgetary authority)
with an independence similar to that of today’s ECB would materialize. It must
be borne in mind that the ECB’s independence is actually safeguarded by
primary Union law (Articles 127(1) and 282(3) TFEU, as well as Article 7 of the
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB).23
A substantive amendment of primary Union law seems the only viable
option, as the introduction of secondary Union law, namely based on Article
136(1) TFEU or Article 352 TFEU, would arguably not suffice. Article 136(1) TFEU
does allow euro area Member States to adopt specific measures to strengthen the
coordination and surveillance of their budgetary discipline in order to ensure the
proper functioning of the economic and monetary union. It can be noted in this
context that this provision constitutes a separate legal basis for the adoption of
measures that complement the objectives of the two provisions that are explicitly
referred to in Article 136(1) TFEU, namely Articles 121 TFEU (multilateral surveil-
lance procedure) and Article 126 TFEU (excessive deficit procedure) (Potacs,
2012:1581). Yet, while a system of common debt issuing would also be aimed at
achieving budgetary discipline in line with what Articles 121 and 126 TFEU state,
this does not remove the aforementioned conflict with Articles 123–125 TFEU. The
same applies for the so-called flexibility clause of Article 352 TFEU, which,
according to the established ECJ case law, forms “an integral part of the institu-
tional system based on the principle of conferred power” and as such “cannot
serve as a basis for widening the scope of [Union] powers beyond the general
framework created by the provisions of the [TFEU] as a whole and, in particular,
by those defining the tasks and the activities of the [Union]”.24 Whilst the
establishment of a system ensuring sound budgetary policies can be considered
a Union objective in the sense of Article 3 TEU, no secondary legal act could
22 Smits has proposed adding a new paragraph 3 to Article 125 TFEU, which states that this
provision does not prevent euro area Member States from “jointly issuing debt instruments and,
in this context, guaranteeing such issuance, provided the Member States participating in this
issuance ensure an equitable distribution of the proceeds and respect Article 126”.
23 Protocol No. 4 annexed to the TEU and TFEU, OJ 2012 C 326/230.
24 Brackets added. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, para. 203.
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overcome the substance of Articles 123 to 125 TFEU. This would require a Treaty
change, which cannot be achieved on the basis of Article 352 TFEU.25
Avoiding Treaty amendment through the use of a purely intergovernmental
solution similar to the ESM Treaty would, furthermore, not be an option for the
proposed system of common debt issuing either, as the ECJ has made clear in
Pringle that Member States “may not disregard their duty to comply with Union
law when exercising their competences” and that commitments that are created
by an intergovernmental agreement such as the ESM Treaty have to be “con-
sistent with European Union law”.26
The introduction of common debt issuing would thus have to take place via
the stony path of an ordinary Treaty amendment procedure as laid down in
Article 48 TEU with all the associated political pitfalls and risks of failure.
A simplified Treaty revision procedure as foreseen in Article 48(6) TEU by
unanimity decision by the European Council is not an option, since this path
is only open if the proposed amendment does not increase the competences
conferred on the Union in the Treaties. Yet, the introduction of an exclusive right
for the Union to issue loans to Member States and the prohibition for Member
States to refinance themselves in the markets constitutes such an additional
transfer of competences.
What is more, the impact of the introduction of such a system would not be
limited to Title III TFEU on Union policies and internal actions, but also touch
upon the institutional provisions in primary Union law, namely if a new Union
body would be created for that purpose. In fact, it has been rightly observed that
the establishment of common debt issuing requires an adequate mechanism
ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability. In its final report, the Expert
Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills observes in this regard:
“Parliamentary accountability is key. Models should be found to ensure it at
both levels: accountability provided by the European Parliament for decisions
taken at European level, but also a key role for national parliaments given their
continued power of the purse” (Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and
Eurobills, 2014:86). The case for solid legitimacy and accountability mechanisms
is further supported by the fact that for the reasons stated above, common debt
issuing would have to be accompanied by strict conditionality. Past experience
with the monitoring of the economic adjustment programmes by the so-called
Troika, consisting of (representatives of) the European Commission, the ECB and
the IMF, highlight how problematic such arrangements can be.27 It is somewhat
26 Case C-370/12 Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 68 and 109.
27 See e.g. European Parliament, Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika
(ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries (2013/2277(INI)).
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of a missed opportunity that the ECJ in Pringle did not reflect on the conse-
quences of the application of the ESM and specifically of policy conditionality
on the Union’s own structural principle of representative democracy stated in
Article 10 TEU (Amtenbrink, 2014:233).
It is exactly on this last point that national (constitutional) law may restrict
the options of the Union legislator and Member States in designing a system of
common debt issuing.
4.2 National perspective28
For the reasons stated in the previous section, from a supranational perspective,
the introduction of a system of common debt issuing would arguably be subject
to the very high hurdle of an ordinary Treaty amendment procedure. Part of this
hurdle is created by the necessary ratification process in all Member States in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Leaving aside the
question of whether the required majorities could be achieved in the national
parliaments, an essentially political issue, the question arises, to what extent a
European system of common debt issuing under the control of a newly created
independent European body, paired with the prohibition to seek financing in the
financial market, would face fundamental constitutional objections in the
national domain.
4.2.1 Deducing national constitutional requirements for common debt issuance
from national constitutional identities
A comprehensive overview over the several national constitutional requirements
would go beyond the scope of the present contribution as it would have to involve
the study of the legal situation in at least all 19 euro area Member States. However,
recent decisions by national highest (constitutional) courts on the relationship
between national (constitutional) law and EU law, both before and after the break-
out of the sovereign debt crisis, arguably provide important clues to the type of
national constitutional hurdles that the introduction of such a system could face.
Indeed, it should be recalled that national (written and unwritten) constitutions, as
well as highest (constitutional) courts, continue to fulfil a vital role in today’s
Union, as “the European legal order defines and limits the exercise of public power
beyond the state, it only provides for the organisational framework required to
28 The following draws in parts on Amtenbrink (2012) and Amtenbrink (2014).
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legitimise the exercise of public power to a limited extent,” as courts take on the
role as a guardian of broader constitutional identity (Amtenbrink, 2012:47/62).
It is this admittedly rather vague concept that connects rulings of highest
(constitutional) courts in different Member States, which in different ways and
concerning a variety of Union acts identify what may be referred to as a
constitutional core, the alteration of which by the Union legislator may be
conditional on the consent of the constituting power or even excluded alto-
gether. What makes some rulings by national highest (constitutional) courts
interesting in the present context is the direct link that is made between the
principle of democracy and the role of national parliaments with what national
courts consider to constitute the constitutional core.
Already prior to the crisis, the French Constitutional Council (Conseil
Constitutionnel) in its decision on the French Act pertaining to copyright and
related rights in the information society29 referred to rules and principles that
are “inherent to the constitutional identity of France” that cannot be disregarded
“except when the constituting power consents thereto”.30 As has been argued
elsewhere, “the reference to a constitutional identity of France suggests that the
primacy of the European legal order would not be considered acceptable in a
situation in which this would run contrary to the basic constitutional structure
as laid down in Article 1 of the French Constitution. This provision refers inter
alia to France being a secular, democratic and social Republic, organised on a
decentralised basis” (Amtenbrink, 2012:48).
In its decision on the constitutionality of the Treaty of Accession to the EU,
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjny) noted: “The principle
of interpreting domestic law in a manner ‘sympathetic to European law’, as
formulated within the Constitutional Tribunal’s jurisprudence, has its limits. In
no event may it lead to results contradicting the explicit wording of constitu-
tional norms or being irreconcilable with the minimum guarantee functions
realised by the Constitution. In particular, the norms of the Constitution within
the field of individual rights and freedoms indicate a minimum and unsurpas-
sable threshold which may not be lowered or questioned as a result of the
introduction of Community provisions.”31 The Polish judges also stated that in
case of irreconcilable inconsistency between national and European norms it is up
to the Polish constitutional legislator to take an “autonomous decision as
29 Thereby transforming Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society (OJ 2001 L167/10).
30 2006-540 DC. para. 19.
31 Judgment of 11th May 2005, K18/04, para. 14.
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regards the appropriate manner of resolving that inconsistency, including the
expediency of a revision of the Constitution”.32
Already in its much-cited decision on the constitutionality of the ratification
of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the German Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) noted that the development of
the German state is bound “to the essential content of the constitutional order
specified therein, and seeks thus to fortify the constitution in force against a
development aimed at a new order, without being able itself to lay down rules
binding on the constitution-making power”.33 In its ruling on the constitutionality
of the German act ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Court has empha-
sized the importance of the observance of democratic principles and the obliga-
tion of the German constitutional bodies to ensure that “as regards the transfer of
sovereign powers and the elaboration of the European decision-making proce-
dures […] in an overall view, the political system of the Federal Republic of
Germany as well as that of the European Union comply with democratic princi-
ples within the meaning of Article 20.1 and 20.2 in conjunction with Article 79.3 of
the Basic Law.”34 In fact, Germany’s highest judges reserve to themselves the
right to an “identity review”, which is considered to have its roots in Article 23(1)
in conjunction with Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law and which basically
protects from amending Article 1 on the inviolability of human dignity and
binding force of human rights, as well as Article 20, which defines the basic
constitutional principles, specifically the principle of (parliamentary) democracy.
The relevance of the position of national constitutions, and specifically the
principle of democracy embedded therein, in considering any supranational or
international legal regime introducing common debt issuing is highlighted by
recent decisions more directly related to the regulatory response to the sovereign
debt crisis in the euro area, inter alia on the adoption of the EFSM Regulation,
the amendment of Article 136 TFEU, and the conclusion of the ESM Treaty and
the Fiscal Compact.
In their decision on the Polish act of ratification of the European Council
Decision amending Article 136 TFEU, the Polish judges seem to be critical on the
reach of the ESM Treaty, which for the time being actually does not even apply
to Poland as a non-euro area Member State. In their view, this Treaty “changed
the architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union”, which has serious
32 Ibid, para. 1.
33 BVerfGE 89, 155. English translation available in [1994] 1 CMLR. 57, section B, para.32
34 Brackets added. BVerfG, Judgment of 30 June 2009 – 2 BvE 2/08, para. 245. The English
language version is available at www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Entscheidungen/EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.html
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implications for the signatory Member States that “accept an obligation […] to
cover their share of capital in that institution, as well as to provide – upon
fulfilment of further premises – funds to cover the subscribed capital, or even to
cover the shares of any insolvent signatories to the Treaty [, which] implies
a substantial burden for the budgets of the Member States involved.”35 Given
this view, it is not surprising that the Polish judges have suggested that a future
ratification of the ESM Treaty may become subject to constitutional review.36
The Irish Supreme Court has taken a rather European-friendly approach to
the constitutional review of the ESM Treaty, concluding that said Treaty does not
encroach upon the economic or monetary sovereignty of Ireland and as such
does not infringe Irish constitutional law.37 Even the emergency voting proce-
dure of Article 4(4) ESM Treaty, which allows for the decision on financial
assistance to be taken by a qualified majority of 85% of the votes cast, thereby
making it arithmetically possible to overrule Member States with a small capital
share in the ESM, was considered “a specific policy of the ESM Treaty, through a
specified mechanism, within the limits of the specified maximum financial
contribution”, rather than a major restriction of parliamentary sovereignty.38
By contrast, the Estonian Supreme Court (Riigikohus) came to the prelimin-
ary conclusion that the granting of financial assistance as a result of the
application of the emergency voting procedure foreseen in Article 4(4) ESM
Treaty may in fact “affect the revenue and expenditure of the Estonian state
budget and thereby restrict the budgetary-political choices of the Estonian
Parliament (Riigikogu)” and considered this “an interference with the financial
competence of the Riigikogu [which] brings about also an interference with the
principle of a democratic state subject to the rule of law and of the state’s
financial sovereignty since indirectly the people’s right of discretion is
restricted.”39 For the majority of presiding judges, the way out of the looming
clash of Estonian constitutional law with the ESM Treaty was the construction of
a constitutional justification based on the given (economic) circumstances at the
time. Yet, as has been observed elsewhere, the extent to which the Estonian
35 As already noted in Amtenbrink (2014:229–230). Polish Constitutional Tribunal, decision of
26 June 2013, Ref. No. K 33/12, section 7.6.1. Brackets added. The English language version used
here is available at http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/news/judgments/art/4607-europejski-mechanizm-
stabilnosci-zarzadzanie-warunkami-uczestnictwa-polski-w-unii-walutowej-okre.
36 Polish Constitutional Tribunal, decision of 26 June 2013, Ref. No. K 33/12, section 7.6.1.
37 The Supreme Court, Appeal No. 339/2012, judgment of 19 October 2012, sections 17 iv and vi.
38 Supreme Court, Appeal No. 339/2012, judgment of 19 October 2012, section 17 xi of the
judgment. See already Amtenbrink (2014:230).
39 Brackets added. Estonian Supreme Court, constitutional judgment 3-4-1-6-12 of 12 July 2012,
para. 153, 159. An English translation can be found at www.riigikohus.ee/?id=1347.
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Court was split on this issue becomes clear from the number and tone of
descending opinions (Amtenbrink, 2014:229).
The approach of the German Federal Constitutional Court to the constitu-
tionality of the crisis measures completes the picture. Already in its decision on
the constitutionality of the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, the
German Court stressed that Article 38 of the German Basic Law on parliamentary
elections and the general right to vote excludes a transfer of tasks and compe-
tences to the supranational level that would result in the draining of the
legitimation of and influence on the exercise of state power that derives from
general parliamentary elections on such a scale that the principle of democracy,
which is protected from amendment by the eternity clause of Article 73(3) of the
German Basic Law, is violated.40
Yet it is the German ruling on the constitutionality of the German (bilateral)
financial aid to Greece and the German guarantee in the context of the EFSM
that may offer the clearest view of the kind of national constitutional issues
arising from the introduction of a system of common debt issuance in the euro
area that comes paired with a system of joint and several liability and some type
of independent European budgetary authority. In the view of the German Court,
“[t]he decision on public revenue and public expenditure is a fundamental part
of the ability of a constitutional state to democratically shape itself […]. The
German Bundestag must make decisions on revenue and expenditure with
responsibility to the people. In this connection, the right to decide on the budget
is a central element of the democratic development of informed opinion”.41 In
this context, the German federal constitutional judges have stressed that this
right to decide on the budget not only constitutes “an instrument of compre-
hensive parliamentary monitoring of the government”, but also “brings the
fundamental principle of equality of the citizens up to date in the imposition
of public charges as an essential manifestation of constitutional democracy […].
In relation to the other constitutional bodies involved in establishing the
budget, the elected parliament has a paramount constitutional position.”42
Consequently, the Court has emphasized that “[a]s representatives of the people,
the elected Members of the German Bundestag must retain control of fundamental
budgetary decisions even in a system of intergovernmental administration”.43
40 BVerfGE 55, 189, Headnote No. 1.
41 BVerfGE 129, 124, Headnotes No. 2 and 3. English language version available at www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2011/09/rs20110907_
2bvr098710en.html
42 Brackets added. BVerfGE 129, 124, para. 122.
43 BVerfGE 129, 124, para. 124–125.
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The German judges have also delivered a stern warning to the German federal
parliament, which “may not transfer its budgetary responsibility to other actors
by means of imprecise budgetary authorisations. In particular it may not, even by
statute, deliver itself up to any mechanisms with financial effect which – whether
by reason of their overall conception or by reason of an overall evaluation of the
individual measures – may result in incalculable burdens with budget relevance
without prior mandatory consent, whether these are expenses or losses of rev-
enue”.44 In fact, parliament may not be limited to “merely re-enacting and […] no
longer exercise overall budgetary responsibility as part of its right to decide on
the budget.”45
Consequently, in the view of the Court, the German federal parliament
cannot enter an intergovernmentally or supranationally agreed automatic guar-
antee or performance “which is not subject to strict requirements and whose
effects are not limited, which – once it has been set in motion – is removed from
the Bundestag’s control and influence.”46 What is excluded is an “indiscriminate
authorisation in a substantial degree to guarantees, fiscal disposals of other
Member States” which “might lead to irreversible, possibly massive, restrictions
on national political legislative discretions.”47 The German judges go on to
emphasise that “no permanent mechanisms may be created under international
treaties which are tantamount to accepting liability for decisions by free will of
other states, above all if they entail consequences which are hard to calculate”
and, moreover, that the German parliament “must specifically approve every
large-scale measure of aid of the Federal Government taken in a spirit of
solidarity and involving public expenditure on the international or European
Union level”.48 Supranational agreements that may be “of structural significance
for Parliament’s right to decide on the budget, for example by giving guarantees
the honouring of which may endanger budget autonomy, or by participation in
equivalent financial safeguarding systems” not only require parliamentary con-
sent but must moreover ensure that “sufficient parliamentary influence will
continue in existence on the manner in which the funds made available are
dealt with”.49
The German Federal Constitutional Court reiterated this view in its order
on several applications for the issue of temporary injunctions to prevent the
44 BVerfGE 129, 124, para. 124–125.
45 BVerfGE 129, 124, para. 124–125. Brackets added.
46 BVerfGE 129, 124, para. 127.
47 BVerfGE 129, 124, para. 127.
48 BVerfGE 129, 124, para. 128.
49 BVerfGE 129, 124, para. 128.
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ratification of the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact.50 Engaging the question
under what circumstances a payment obligation or commitment entered into
could be considered to encroach upon the protected core of budgetary autonomy
of the parliament, the German judges refer to “a manifest overstepping of
extreme limits”, whereby “the payment obligations and commitments to accept
liability took effect in such a way that budget autonomy, at least for an appreci-
able period of time, was not merely restricted but effectively failed.”51 In this
context, the Court has referred to a broad latitude of the legislator that has to be
recognized also by the Court itself. With reference to the Treaty’s legal frame-
work on economic and monetary policy, the Court notably stressed that in
principle “it is not anti-democratic from the outset for the budget legislature to
be bound by a particular budget and fiscal policy”, which also becomes clear
from the constitutional debt break that the German Basic Law foresees itself,
even when this restriction derives from an obligation under European Union law
or international law.52 While concluding that the German constitution, specifi-
cally Article 38(1), as well as Article 20(1) and (2) in conjunction with Article 79
(3) of the German Basic Law, do not stand in the way of a ratification of the ESM
Treaty, the German Court observed that its conclusion is reached based on a
particular interpretation of the ESM provisions on the increased capital call, the
provisions on the inviolability of the documents, as well as the professional
secrecy of the legal representatives of the ESM.53 With regard to the former,
the German judges emphasised the importance of the binding limitation of
Germany’s budget commitments resulting from the ESM Treaty and stressed
that Germany “must ensure the required clarification in the ratification proce-
dure” so that the liability is indeed limited to its share of the authorised capital
stock that is foreseen in Article 8(5) ESM Treaty.54
4.2.2 Core constitutional requirements across Member States’ constitutions
From the admittedly incomplete but nevertheless significant selection of judg-
ments by highest national (constitutional) courts, several constitutional princi-
ples can arguably be deduced, which may be considered common among the
50 BVerfG, Order of 12 September 2012 – 2 BvR 1390/12. English translation available at www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2012/09/rs20120912_
2bvr139012en.html
51 BVerfG, Order of 12 September 2012 – 2 BvR 1390/12, para. 216–217. Brackets added.
52 BVerfG, Order of 12 September 2012 – 2 BvR 1390/12, para. 224–225.
53 BVerfG, Order of 12 September 2012 – 2 BvR 1390/12, para. 240 et seq.
54 BVerfG, Order of 12 September 2012 – 2 BvR 1390/12, para. 242–243, 253.
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constitutions of the Member States that would participate in a joint debt issu-
ance scheme. They can be considered common because the principles applicable
to a European debt issuance scheme derive from the principle of democracy,
which can be found in all national constitutions. These core constitutional
principles applicable to common debt issuance cover the right of the national
parliament to decide autonomously on the revenue and the expenditure of the
national budget and the protection of the national budgetary autonomy, which
requires a predefined limitation of the possible commitments of national bud-
gets for extranational purposes. The principled nature of the latter derives from
the fact that the budgetary rights of a national parliament would be rendered
meaningless if the extranational commitments of the national budget exceeded
its overall revenue.
Against this background, it should be noted that the constitutional situation
in Germany, as reflected in the judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court,
while receiving much attention, may not be entirely unique in the euro area as
this is unlikely to be the only euro area Member State for which this applies. This
is arguably due to the fact that common debt issuance may in several regards
touch upon what these courts could consider to form part of the core constitu-
tional principles.
4.3 Assessing the various “Eurobonds” models against core
constitutional requirements
Before assessing the several proposals for the introduction of a system of
(partial) common debt issuing, as outlined in Section 2, against the core national
constitutional principles just described, it is worth repeating the three distinctive
elements of these models: the presence of joint and several liability, the provi-
sion for a limitation of the covered debt (based on either its size, maturity, or
date of issuance), and the inclusion of a compensation scheme.
Common to all “Eurobonds” proposals is the banning of participating
Member States from turning to the financial markets for those parts of the
debt that are covered by a common issuance. Here the question arises whether
already the exclusion of new borrowing could be considered a restriction of
parliamentary budgetary autonomy in breach of the principle of democracy.
While the answer to this question must obviously be reserved to a full constitu-
tional evaluation for all Member States, it can be noted that currently already the
Fiscal Compact obliges the signatory Member States to budgetary positions that
are balanced or in surplus. In fact, Member States are even required to include a
corresponding rule in national law that are “of binding force and permanent
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character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully
respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes” (Art. 3
(1)(a) and (2) TSCG). Moreover, national law must also foresee mechanisms that
automatically apply to correct significant deviations from the medium-term
budgetary objectives (Art. 3 (1)(e) and (2) TSCG). Against this background, it is
questionable whether the exclusion of autonomous refinancing on private finan-
cial markets is necessarily problematic from a constitutional point of view.
As regards joint and several liability, it becomes clear from the above cited
case-law of the German Federal Constitutional Court that a system of common
debt issuing based on such joint and several liability may be difficult to recon-
cile with the budgetary autonomy of parliament, in particular if the actual
decisions on the issuing of common debt and granting of loans would be in
the hands of an independent European budgetary authority at the supranational
level. In the first place, different to the ESM where at least in the case of Member
States with large capital shares, no decisions can be taken without the consent
of their governments, a democratic link to the national constitutional order
would be absent in the case of a European budgetary authority that would be
independent from government decision-making bodies at the European and
national level, similarly to the ECB. It is rather doubtful whether possible
national government or parliamentary involvement in the appointment of the
decision-making body of such a European body would be considered sufficient
to secure national budgetary autonomy of parliament. Yet, whereas a more
direct involvement of national parliaments in the actual decision-making at
the European level may provide a solution from the legal point of view, this
would raise questions about the actual insulation of the decision to issue
European debt from unwarranted (national) political influence.
What is more, any incalculable risk-sharing under a permanent common
debt issuing scheme would be very problematic. This would not only restrict the
budgetary autonomy of parliament at the time of the initial agreement for the
establishment of such a framework, but also future parliaments. At least from
the perspective of German constitutional law it is very questionable whether this
could be reconciled specifically with Article 20(1) and (2) in conjunction with
Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law.55 This consideration supports three
conclusions. First, joint and several liability is not per se excluded by core
constitutional requirements provided that, second, the amount for which a
national budget can be held liable is defined in advance and limited in such a
55 Another question is whether unrealized liabilities resulting from the participation in such a
system would have to be considered as debt that is covered by the national constitutional debt
ceiling.
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way that national parliament is in a position to effectively appreciate the
potential liability risk. Third, joint and several liability without any limitation
is likely to conflict with national core constitutional requirements in a way that
national constitutions would have to be amended in order to allow for such
models of “Eurobonds”.
This may be different for those proposals (Juncker and Tremonti, 2010; De
Grauwe and Moesen, 2009) that envisage the participating Member States’
liability to be founded on a pro rata basis combined with a system of paid-in
and committed callable capital, as with the ESM. Such arrangements are less
intrusive in a constitutional sense, as the pro rata principle makes the actual
liability predictable. Yet, it is at least uncertain how common bonds that are not
guaranteed jointly and severally by all participating Member States would be
perceived by the financial markets. Perhaps in such a case the risk premium and
thus also the conditions under which an independent European body could offer
loans to euro area Member States could be much less favourable than would
otherwise be the case.
This leads to the assessment of the second distinctive element of the
“Eurobonds” proposals: the kind of limitation that would comply with core
constitutional requirements beyond the pro rata principle. A limitation based
on either the volume (Delpla and von Weizsäcker, 2010), the maturity (Hellwig
and Philippon, 2011) or the date of issuance (Sachverständigenrat, 2011) cer-
tainly puts national parliaments in a position to better estimate the potential risk
of entering into a joint and several liability arrangement. Yet, the fact that the
financial risks for the national budgets can be quantified does not on its own
result in a constitutionality of the Eurobond proposals containing a limitation.
Besides the possibility to quantify the risk, the amount defined by the respective
criteria for quantification may not undermine the budgetary autonomy. Given,
for example, if the overall volume were limited by restricting common debt
issuing to national debt amounting to 60% of GDP (as proposed in the “blue
bonds” proposal) for euro area Member States, that overall amount could still
potentially equal around 6.000 billion Euro56 in 2015. A comparison with the
national budget of Germany, which amounted to 301.6 billion Euro in 2015,
clearly shows that this limitation is unlikely to restrict the debt covered by joint
and several liability in a way that would be considered not to harm the budget-
ary autonomy of the Member States.57
56 Based on the overall GDP of the euro area, which amounts to 10.4 trillion Euro in 2015, cf.
Eurostat, GDP and main components.
57 It is important to note that this comparison does not imply that a risk assessment has to be
based on a “doom’s day” scenario where all participating Member States go bankrupt. The
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Moreover, joint and several liability requires not only that a predefined
share of national debt is included in the European scheme, but also that
national parliaments are given the right to renew on a periodic basis the
commitments of the national budgets. An example of such parliamentary
involvement can be found in the “blue bond proposal”, according to which
the annual decision on the allocation of the Eurobonds backed by a joint and
several guarantee would be taken by the national parliaments of the participat-
ing Member States. According to this proposal, the refusal of a national
parliament to adopt the necessary decision would result in the exclusion of
the respective Member State from Eurobonds and hence, relieve it of all liability
for the bonds. In this way, national parliaments would effectively decide
annually on smaller portions of the guaranteed extranational debt. Yet, it
may be argued that such a procedure may only delay the moment in time at
which the threshold of harming the budgetary autonomy is reached by
annually piling up extranational debt for which the national budget can be
held liable. Moreover, from an economic point of view, the question is what the
effects of the exit of a major euro area Member State from the liability regime
would be on the marketability of European debt instruments and hence, on the
conditions under which a European body could lend money to euro area
Member States.
A different conclusion can, however, be reached with regard to the so-called
“Eurobills” proposal, which only covers short-term mutualised debt of less than
one year (Hellwig and Philippon, 2011). According to this scheme, Member
States are only allowed to hold such short-term bonds to refinance debt up to
10% of their GDP. This yields an overall risk of 1.000 billion Euro for the euro
area. Since these short-term bonds have to be renewed at least once per year, the
risk can be re-evaluated at regular intervals. The “Eurobills” proposal remains
silent on the involvement of national parliaments, as it only mentions that the
European body in charge (the so-called “joint debt management office”) would
make quarterly issues of “Eurobills” covering the refinancing needs of the
Member States. One could now imagine that, following the procedural require-
ments suggested in the “blue bond” proposal, national parliaments would
approve the issuance of Eurobills either annually or even quarterly. Given the
background of the core constitutional requirements for common debt issuance
developed in Section 4.2.1, it may be concluded that the “Eurobills” proposal
assessment must rather be made on the basis of the likelihood of a payment in the event of a
default of participating Member States and on the basis the ability of the guaranteeing Member
State to refinance payments that are due in the event of such a default.
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extended by a system of parliamentary approval can in principle be brought in
line with national constitutional requirements.
Finally, as regards the introduction of a compensation scheme as a limiting
factor, it has to be noted that such compensation is primarily required by EU law
in order to meet the criteria set by Article 125(1) TFEU, rather than by core
constitutional requirements. Compensation schemes aim at siphoning advan-
tages for Member States that accrued on the basis of the better risk profile of
commonly issued debt. These advantages could otherwise be considered as
some sort of indirect financing of Member States whose national government
bonds could only be sold at higher interest rates than commonly issued debt.
From the perspective of national budgets, the “cost” linked to the interest rate
advantage that is inherent to the idea of Eurobonds, is the differential between
the interest rate paid by Member States to financial market operators when
issuing Eurobonds as compared to the interest rate that they might have paid
in case they had issued national bonds. In the event the differential amounts to
an interest rate disadvantage, this cost is, however, presumably so little that is
does not affect the budgetary autonomy and would therefore not conflict with
core constitutional principles. Yet, such waiver of revenue for the national
budget would most likely require approval by the national parliaments in
order to pass the constitutionality check.
Finally, with regard to those models that require the fulfilment of certain
economic policy goals in order to join and to remain in a system of common debt
issuance, the role of the authority that negotiates and enforces strict condition-
ality in a recipient Member State could become the subject of constitutional
challenges. The fact that – at least indirectly – the role of such an authority
could become subject to constitutional review is highlighted specifically by the
example of the several successful constitutional challenges in Portugal of bud-
getary laws inter alia aimed at implementing the economic adjustment pro-
gramme agreed by the Portuguese government in the context of the financial
assistance received under the EFSM/EFSF.
In sum, mutualised debt secured by joint and several liability is difficult
to align with core constitutional requirements. Only those schemes that limit
the total amount of covered debt by predefined criteria could pass the consti-
tutionality check, provided that the overall amount does not exceed the ability
of a Member State’s national budget to assume the liabilities in the event of the
most likely default scenario. As shown above, only the “Eurobills” proposal
meets these criteria. Other than that, only schemes based on pro rata liability
can be considered in line with core constitutional requirements. National par-
liaments must, in any event, retain the right to approve the common issuance
of debt.
630 F. Amtenbrink et al.
Brought to you by | Erasmus University Rotterdam
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/5/16 2:51 PM
5 Concluding observations
To answer the somewhat rhetoric question included in the title of this con-
tribution, it can be concluded from a political economy point of view that there
is certainly still life in the idea of the introduction of a system of common debt
issuing, even if this has to be perceived as a medium to long-term project,
rather than a quick fix for current issues of the euro area. Indeed, common
debt issuing can be more than a crisis instrument to compensate for the
absence of autonomous monetary policy instruments and exchange rates. It
could function as a structural instrument to strengthen economic policy coor-
dination and sound budgetary policies in the euro area in a more sustainable
way. Key to the success of any such system is the effective dealing with legacy
debt.
Yet, the notable absence of any reference to Eurobonds or Stability Bonds in
recent European policy documents signifies the current lack of political support,
which may at least in the case of Germany also result from the clear language of
the constitutional judges on the position of the budgetary autonomy of national
parliaments at the core of what is effectively protected from constitutional
amendment. In this regard, the German constitutional situation may somewhat
distract from the fact that the introduction of such a system may not only face
constitutional opposition in other Member States, but also requires a fundamen-
tal overhaul of primary Union law.
From the combined political economy and legal analysis, it becomes
apparent that there are trade-offs between what is legally conceivable given
the current state of European integration and what is desirable from a prac-
tical point of view to introduce an effective system of common debt issuing. Be
that as it may, here it is argued that even with the reformed framework of
economic policy coordination in place, the euro area is still in need of
effective instruments to ensure budgetary discipline in the euro area in a
credible way in the future. It remains questionable whether this can only be
achieved by a large-scale transfer of fiscal policy competences to the suprana-
tional level.
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